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1. Introduction 
 
A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how neuroscientific 
technologies could and should contribute to criminal justice. On the one hand, there is the use of 
neurotechnologies to read the subject’s brain in order to obtain information, such as brain-based 
diagnostics, lie and memory detection [1]. The results of some of such applications are already being 
used within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, 
and the Netherlands [2–5], typically to determine guilt or establish a neurological diagnosis relevant to 
legal responsibility or recidivism risk. On the other hand, there are applications aiming to intervene into 
persons’ minds/brains for various purposes, ranging from preventing crimes or enhancing eyewitness 
testimony to facilitating offender rehabilitation [6]. This paper addresses only the first type of 
application; it examines brain-reading, not brain-alteration.6  
 In criminal procedures, defendants and convicted offenders are not always willing to cooperate 
with the authorities. The question thus arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used without 
valid consent in a forensic context. To date, forensic ‘brain-reading’ has typically been performed with 
the subject’s consent [7], but would it be factually possible, legally permissible and morally acceptable 
to deploy brain-reading against the subject’s will [8–10]? And if so, under what conditions?  In the U.S. 
legal context, a right to ‘mental privacy’ that protects citizens from non-consensual brain-reading has 
been advocated [11]. In Europe, Marcello Ienca and Roberto Andorno have called for the recognition 
of a novel fundamental right to mental privacy [12], and so has Andrea Lavazza [13]. In this paper, we 
explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are decisive in 
the European context.  
 To answer this question, we explore the extent to which the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) protects against non-consensual brain-reading in matters of criminal procedure. 
Because the ECHR does not explicitly address brain-reading procedures – and neither do its travaux 
préparatoires – we need to establish the extent to which privacy interests regarding brain-reading are 
protected as part of more general current provisions. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be 
derived from, or at least developed within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
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(ECtHR/the Court), most plausibly as part of the general right to ‘private life’ (Article 8 ECHR; 
reiterated in Articles 7 and 8 European Charter for Fundamental Rights and Freedoms). Although we 
acknowledge the importance and intricacies of mental privacy, we argue that introducing an additional 
fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. Moreover, introducing 
novel distinct rights may even be detrimental as it may lead to inconsistencies in privacy protection. 
Regulations of forensic investigations of brains should cohere with other regulations, in this case, 
regulations concerning other methods of criminal investigation, such as DNA-testing. However, in 
order to guarantee the effective enjoyment of mental privacy, a specification of the implications of the 
generic right to respect for private life for particular neurotechnologies and purposes is required. 
Drawing out such implications is a commonplace legal activity and does not require novel rights. 
Furthermore, our analysis shows that in its current understanding, some types of non-consensual brain-
reading could be lawful – and this is an issue that may require political discussion as well as further 
development of the law.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. To prepare the ground for our subsequent normative 
analysis, in section 2 we first briefly discuss current possibilities and limitations of brain-reading 
technologies in the criminal justice context. Subsequently, in section 3, we examine the ways in which 
the ECHR presently provides safeguards against forensic brain-reading through the rights to freedom 
of thought and privacy, as well as the right not to incriminate oneself. Based on our findings, in section 
4, we assess, from both a legal and ethical perspective, two recent calls for creating a novel fundamental 
right to mental privacy.     
 
2. Brain-reading in criminal justice: what is possible?  
Brain-reading promises to yield information relevant for the law, especially criminal law. Recent 
research focuses on neuroimaging technologies, such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), computed tomography (CT) and electroencephalography (EEG). 
Two types of neuroimaging can be distinguished: structural and functional [14]. While structural 
neuroimaging, such as MRI and CT, reveals the biological structure of the brain (i.e. brain anatomy), 
functional neuroimaging, such as fMRI and EEG, measures brain activity (i.e. brain physiology). 
Progress in these technologies, and the computations powering them, has revolutionised the way we 
understand the human brain. Moreover, to some extent, imaging results also allow inferences to be 
drawn regarding a person’s mental states. Thus, neuroimaging reads not only brains, but sometimes 
also minds. In particular, neuroimaging can detect mental reactions of persons to visual and other stimuli 
to which they are exposed, and some of these reactions are automatic, non-conscious, not under the 
willful control of the person, or a combination thereof. This may be an attractive feature of 
neuroimaging for some forensic purposes, for example, as a way of bypassing deliberate attempts to 
deceive the authorities.  
A range of potentially relevant applications are currently under development. Among the most 
promising for forensic purposes are: (1) brain-based lie detection [15]; (2) detection of whether a 
stimulus is novel or familiar to the person (‘concealed information test’) [16]; (3) assessment of mental 
capacities and performance, as well as mental disorders, e.g. for the determination of fitness to stand 
trial, assessment of culpability, the applicability of the insanity defence, or for substantiating claims of 
victims [17]; and (4) identification of preferences, likes or dislikes, or other character traits or 
dispositions, from aggressiveness to paedophilia [18,19].  
Some of these applications are already in use in Europe. For example, as the studies of Hafner, 
Catley and Claydon, and De Kogel and Westgeest show, neuroimaging has been used in criminal cases 
in the context of, inter alia, establishing legal insanity, i.e. for forensic psychiatric assessments of 
defendants [2,4,5]. To be clear, many of these applications are still in laboratory stages and not (yet) at 
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a stage that allows their admission in legal proceedings.7 Nevertheless, some show promising 
(preliminary) results. For instance, a study by Aharoni and colleagues found a “neurocognitive 
biomarker for persistent antisocial behaviour”, which they extended to “neuroprediction of future 
arrest” [20]. The researchers tested ACC activity in subjects (n=96) through an impulse control task 
while their brain was scanned via fMRI. They then related the brain data and other risk factors to the 
rearrest rate four years after release. They found that ACC activity predicts rearrest. The researchers 
note that these measures will likely not outperform other measures, but still they may add some 
predictive value and so have a role to play in a larger assessment battery. An interesting example of 
such an ‘interactive approach’, is the study of Delfin et al., who performed a long-term follow-up study 
on the prediction of recidivism of forensic psychiatric patients, using both traditional risk assessment 
tools and resting-state SPECT data. One of the “incremental effects of neuroimaging data” they 
reported, was the increase of accuracy rate from 64% to 82% [21]. 
These and related matters could become relevant during criminal (but also other) proceedings 
at some point. Brain data will likely be used in combination with other data, for example, to inform 
psychiatric evaluations. Given that epistemic access to other minds is in principle limited, and since 
current risk assessment tools are far from perfect [22], neuroimaging may make a significant 
contribution [19,21,23], especially with respect to people who refuse to cooperate, malinger, or simulate 
– or are suspected of doing so.  
Two severe limitations should also be noted. First, the neurobiological studies provide findings 
at group level. Applying them to individuals requires further information and inferences. Second, as 
yet, the risk of participants actively sabotaging certain measurements, e.g., by moving their heads in the 
brain scanner or employing other countermeasures, cannot be entirely excluded [24,25].  
Despite important limitations of current technologies for brain-reading, we should look beyond 
today’s horizon, anticipating developments and considering potential legal and ethical implications of 
non-consensual forensic brain-reading for the subject’s privacy interests. In the U.S., a debate about 
these issues has been ongoing for over a decade [26,27], and we feel it is time to transfer it to the 
European legal context. The following section explores whether and, if so, to what extent the ECHR 
protects against non-consensual neuroimaging in criminal justice. 
  
3. Exploring current legal protection: The European Convention on Human Rights  
 
3.1 Introduction  
In this section we analyse the extent to which the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
protects against non-consensual neuroimaging in criminal justice. We focus on those rights that may be 
engaged by compulsory governmental acquisition of (personal) information. These are the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9 ECHR), the right to respect for private life 
(Article 8 ECHR), and the right not to incriminate oneself (Article 6 ECHR). 
 
3.2 The right to freedom of thought (Article 9 ECHR) 
We begin with the strongest, because absolute, right: the right to freedom of thought, pursuant to Article 
9(1) ECHR. This right comprises two dimensions, internal (the forum internum) and external (the forum 
externum). Whereas the internal dimension is absolute and may thus not be restricted, infringements of 
the external dimension could, under certain circumstances, be justified (Article 9(2) ECHR). Note, that 
                                                             
7 Here, we wish to note a European difference to the USA dominated discourse. The Frye or Daubert standards, 
according to which new technologies must have “consensus” among experts in the field, are not shared by all 
European, especially civil law jurisdictions. For instance, in Germany, it suffices that an piece of evidence 
potentially helps to find the truth.  
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the forum externum only comprises the manifestation of religion and (religious and non-religious) 
beliefs, not of thoughts. Yet, as Malcom Evans notes, thoughts can be ‘manifested’ through actions, 
primarily via speech and expression, covered by Article 10 ECHR [28, at 285]. Since forensic brain-
reading will normally not (intend to) reveal the individual’s religion or beliefs, we will focus here on 
the freedom of thought as guaranteed by the forum internum of Article 9 ECHR.  
According to the Human Rights Handbook of the Council of Europe, the internal dimension of 
Article 9 ECHR seeks at its most basic level “to prevent state indoctrination of individuals by permitting 
the holding, development, and refinement and ultimately change of personal thought, conscience and 
religion” [27, p. 18].8 Accordingly, the forum internum of the right to freedom of thought seems 
particularly relevant for neurotechnologies that intervene in the subject’s mind or brain, such as 
neuroenhancement through (non-)invasive brain stimulation [9,32,33]. In addition, according to the 
preparatory work on Article 9 ECHR, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion also 
intends to protect “not only from ‘confessions’ imposed for reasons of State, but also from those 
abominable methods of police enquiry or judicial process which rob the suspect or accused person of 
control of his intellectual faculties and of his conscience.”9 Vermeulen and Roosmalen state that 
freedom of thought prohibits any form of compulsion to express thoughts [31, p. 738-739]. Similarly, 
Harris et al. write that States may not require disclosure of someone’s personal convictions [30]. Since 
brain-reading might be thought to involve, or to be equivalent to, the expression or disclosure of 
thoughts, some forms of brain-reading might potentially raise issues under the right to freedom of 
thought as well [34,35].  
Whether brain-reading indeed infringes the right to freedom of thought depends on whether the 
targets of these applications could be classified as ‘thoughts’ within the meaning of Article 9 ECHR. 
The definition of ‘thought’ in this respect is, however, unclear [32]. Case-law indicates a narrow 
approach to the forum internum [29,30]. For example, according to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, 
“The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion denotes only those views that attain a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.”10 Yet, at the same time, a broader 
interpretation has been advocated, covering a wider range of mental states including emotions, dreams, 
and more trivial thoughts such as which car to buy, or which movie to watch [34–36].  
Since the ECtHR has not set out to define ‘thoughts’, and the same is true for the other 
international human rights courts, the precise scope of the right remains unclear. Historically, ‘thought’ 
has been introduced to the UN Declaration alongside the older ‘religion and conscience’ to broaden the 
scope and protect ‘free thinking’ in its entirety, including (modern) scientific, philosophical, and 
political thoughts.11 This speaks for a broader understanding of ‘thought’. However, a de facto 
impossibility of altering and revealing thoughts in a direct way has always been a background 
assumption of the law [32,34,36].12 Neither drafters, nor judges, nor commentators have seriously 
anticipated the possibilities that neuroscience may offer in this respect.13 Historical statements or 
parallels are thus not by definition a convincing guide for a contemporary analysis of the right.  
                                                             
8 Cf. [30, p. 537] and [29, p. 738-739]. 
9 European Commission of Human Rights, Preparatory work on Article 9 of the European Convention on 
human rights, Strasbourg, 16th August 1959, p. 3-4. Cf. Human Rights Committee, General comment no. 22, 
30.07.1993: “No one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.” 
10 ECtHR (GC) S.A.S. v France, appl.nos. 43835/11 (1 July 2014), para 55; ECtHR (GC) İzzettin Doğan and 
others v. Turkey, appl.nos. 62649/10 (26 April 2016), para 68. 
11 W.A. Schabes, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The travaux préparatoires, New York: 
Cambridge University Press 2013, pp. 1766, 2489, 2500 (Soviet Union), 1766-1767 (France) and 2499 
(Uruguay). 
12 Id., pp. 1766, 1768 (France) and 2518 (Argentina). 
13 E.g. Vermeulen & Roosmalen 2018, p. 738: “It is true that thoughts (…) – as long as they have not been 
expressed – are intangible and only realise their full potential by expression in foro externo.” 
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In any case, if a particular brain-reading application reveals information about, for example, the 
subject’s political preferences, scientific thoughts, or philosophical ideas that are protected under 
Article 9 ECHR, this fundamental right will offer legal protection against non-consensual use. However, 
deploying present neuroimaging applications, at least in the context of forensic diagnostics and risk 
assessment, typically does not disclose the defendant’s or convicted offender’s convictions or beliefs 
about morality, politics, or religion. The as-yet-undecided question is whether reading out other kinds 
of thoughts – from ordinary preferences to mundane beliefs – are, or ought to be protected as well [an 
argument to this end is developed in 34–36]. Moreover, whether lie or memory detection qualifies as 
thought detection is even less clear. In such applications, neuroimaging indicates whether or not a 
person performs a particular kind of mental task, i.e. if she is remembering, calculating, daydreaming 
or deceiving. It discloses the process of thinking, but does not reveal the content of ‘thoughts’. If 
detecting types of mental acts qualifies as detecting types of thought, forum internum protection may 
arise. However, whether memories, lies and emotions are covered by the forum internum of Article 9 
ECHR as ‘thoughts’, is not clear at the moment. These are presently open questions that deserve further 
research. In this regard, in our view, the following issues could be relevant.  
First, for the evaluation of whether certain forensic brain-reading applications, such as memory 
and lie detection, would (or should) fall within the scope of freedom of thought, an analogy with 
obligatory witness testimony might be helpful. The use of such testimonies in criminal law is broadly 
accepted, also by the ECHR,14 as normally not raising any issues under the freedom of thought, but, 
potentially, under another right: the right (not) to express oneself pursuant to Article 10 ECHR.15 In 
ordinary questioning, the law imposes a behavioural duty on witnesses to testify truthfully, and this 
requires them to perform a mental task (remembering) and reporting the results. A neuroimaging 
method (‘memory detection’) could consist in showing the person e.g. a picture. The witness’ 
behavioural duty might then be to look at it. If imposing a duty on witnesses to testify truthfully is 
permissible under Article 9 ECHR, why should coercive brain-reading, e.g., memory detection, be 
prohibited? One could argue though, that memory detection requires the subject to attentively observe 
the presented stimuli, and react to them at a given time – forcing him to remember, which might infringe 
on free thinking more severely than a regular witness examination does. However, whether the Court 
would be inclined to follow such a line of reasoning remains to be seen.  
Secondly, although a particular memory or lie detection test focuses on specific questions (e.g., 
do you recognise the defendant?), much (additional) brain data could be acquired through the process. 
For example, an fMRI of a person’s brain in the context of lie detection may yield a great deal of 
information regarding the subject’s brain activity: information connected, but also not connected with 
the particular questions. Although at present it is unlikely that this information would include 
information about the content of a person’s thoughts or beliefs, future re-analysis of the acquired data 
might yield such information. By contrast, witness statements are not normally open to such 
reinterpretation.  
Altogether, if brain-reading reveals thoughts, the right to freedom of thought will likely offer 
(strong) legal protection. But what qualifies as a thought for the purpose of Article 9 ECHR remains 
unclear. On narrow understandings, it is doubtful whether existing forms of brain-reading indeed reveal 
thoughts or beliefs. On broad understandings, it is plausible that they do.  
 
                                                             
14 E.g ECtHR Wanner v. Germany, appl.no. 26892/12 (23 October 2018). 
15 The obligation to take a religious oath, however, could violate article 9 ECHR: ECtHR Buscarini and Others 
v. San Marino, appl.no. 24645/94 (18 February 1999). 
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3.3. The right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR) 
Meanwhile, every mental state or process that does not fall under Article 9 ECHR may be protected by 
Article 8 ECHR. Article 8(1) ECHR protects the right to respect for one’s private life. The ECtHR 
acknowledges that everyone has the right to live privately, away from unwanted attention. According 
to the Grand Chamber, “it would be too restrictive to limit the notion of “private life” to an “inner circle” 
in which the individual may live his or her own personal life as he or she chooses, thus excluding 
entirely the outside world (…). Article 8 thus guarantees a right to “private life” in a broader sense, 
such that it includes, for example, a right to lead a “private social life”, that is, the possibility for the 
individual to develop in private his or her social identity.”16 The notion of private life does, however, 
not lend itself to exhaustive definition.17 Whether particular data recorded and retained by the 
government is protected, depends on “the specific context in which the information at issue has been 
recorded and retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these records are used and processed 
and the results that may be obtained.”18 It is beyond dispute that it includes protection from collection, 
storage and disclosure of personal data19 – as becomes manifest in Article 8 of the European Charter 
for Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as well. In this regard, ‘personal data’ is defined as information 
regarding an individual who could be identified on the basis of the data and other information in the 
public domain.  
Since at present no case-law of the ECtHR exists on the use of non-consensual forensic 
neuroimaging in light of Article 8 ECHR, it may be helpful – in order to explore the legal protection 
afforded to forensic brain-reading under this provision – to compare forensic neuroimaging with other 
methods of criminal investigation about which case-law does already exist [37]. Consider case-law on 
forensic fingerprinting and DNA-testing, which may provide some helpful insights. These methods are 
analogous to forensic brain-reading in the respect that the data they produce relates to biological features 
of the individual (e.g. the structure of one’s fingertip or brain, DNA and hemodynamics in blood and 
brain electricity). Furthermore, according to the ECtHR, DNA and fingerprints contain unique 
information which relates to an identified or identifiable individual, therefore containing protected 
personal data.20 The same is most probably true for neuroimaging since nobody's brain anatomy is 
identical to anyone else’s, even in the case of monozygotic twins [38]. Furthermore, brain activity (more 
specifically, functional brain connectivity) appears also to be unique for any individual, “similarly to a 
fingerprint” [39]. Fingerprints, DNA and neuroimaging data are in this respect similar. Therefore, in 
considering non-consensual forensic brain-reading in light of Article 8 ECHR, we take into account 
case-law of the ECtHR on forensic fingerprinting and DNA-testing. However, we also wish to point to 
two important differences. First, DNA-testing and fingerprinting are used for purposes of identification, 
whereas forensic brain-reading is not. Second, DNA-testing and fingerprinting do not disclose mental 
states, whereas forensic brain-reading does. Here, analogies end.  
In light of the Court’s case-law on yielding personal data through DNA-testing and 
fingerprinting, it is clear that obtaining, retaining and using protected personal neurodata without the 
subject’s consent infringes the right to respect for private life [37]. The crucial question is whether this 
infringement can be justified. According to Article 8(2) ECHR, such infringement could be justified if 
                                                             
16 ECtHR (GC) Bărbulescu v. Romania, appl.no. 61496/08, § 70. 
17 ECtHR (GC) Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, appl.no. 25358/12, § 159 (24 January 2017). 
18 ECtHR (GC) S. & Marper v. UK, appl.nos. 30562/04, 30566/04, § 66 (4 December 2008); De Vries, Karin. 
2018. Right to Respect for Private and Family Life. In Theory and Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ed. Pieter van Dijk et al., 673. Cambridge: Intersentia.  
19 ECtHR (GC) Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, appl.no. 18030/11, § 191 (8 November 2016); ECtHR 
(GC) S. & Marper v. UK, appl.nos. 30562/04, 30566/04, § 66-67 (4 December 2008). 
20 ECtHR (GC) S. & Marper v. UK, appl.nos. 30562/04, 30566/04, § 72, 75, 84 (4 December 2008); ECtHR 
Aycaguer v. France, appl.no. 8806/12, § 33 (22 June 2017). 
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it (1) is based on a foreseeable and accessible legal ground, (2) serves a legitimate interest and (3) is 
necessary for and proportionate to the aim (i.e., legitimate interest) being pursued.  
Regarding forensic brain-reading, the first two requirements need not be an obstacle as long as 
its use is regulated by sound legislation, based on which it can be applied in the legitimate interest of 
national security, the detection and prevention of crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others (e.g., by contributing to the assessment of guilt, criminal responsibility or a risk of recidivism). 
Perhaps, member states need to pass new laws, setting out criteria for the use of such data. But this is 
not an obstacle in-principle. However, whether non-consensual forensic neuroimaging will also be 
necessary and proportionate with the interest pursued (third requirement), is more open to debate.  
Ultimately, whether an infringement of the right to respect for private life is necessary and 
proportionate, depends on the seriousness of the infringement. The more serious the infringement, the 
more important its aims should be. In the context of recording, retaining and using personal data, the 
seriousness of the infringement largely depends on the amount and privacy-sensitivity of the data 
concerned.21 For instance, the ECtHR considers cellular samples to be ‘highly personal’, containing 
much sensitive information about (the health of) an individual and a unique genetic code of great 
relevance to both the individual and his relatives.22 DNA-profiles contain a more limited amount of 
personal data, but nonetheless contain ‘substantial amounts of unique personal data’, which enables 
identification of genetic origins and relationships between individuals.23 In addition, the Court remarks 
that – bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in genetics and information technology – it cannot 
discount the possibility that future private-life interests may be adversely affected in novel, yet 
unforeseeable ways.24 Whereas fingerprints contain not as much personal information as cellular 
samples and DNA profiles, they nevertheless constitute personal data containing identifying features.25 
Similarly, one might argue that the results of different neuroimaging applications will also differ 
in their levels of privacy-sensitivity. For example, identifying the mere recognition of a particular car, 
gun or person through memory detection, seems generally to involve less sensitive information than the 
diagnosis of (terminal) brain cancer or a high risk of criminal behaviour. Some future neuroimaging 
technologies might even yield more sensitive data, about specific moral or political commitments, 
feelings about personal relationships, or fundamental personality traits and proclivities (in some cases 
this could also raise an issue under the right to freedom of thought, discussed above). In contrast to 
these possible future neuroimaging technologies, however, the data yielded by current and near-future 
applications on which we focus here, like diagnostics, neuroprediction and memory and lie detection, 
will likely be somewhat more mundane. In the context of criminal justice, they may include, for 
example, information regarding whether the defendant recognises a particular gun or lies about a 
specific alibi at a specific time. Of course, they may also be more sensitive, such as whether someone 
suffers from a specific psychiatric of neurological disorder. 
Whether data of this kind would, in general, be significantly more sensitive than the information 
cellular samples contain, can be debated [37,40,41]. After all, cellular samples contain a wide range of 
sensitive personal data, e.g., regarding health, ethnic origin and genetic relationships. Most of this 
information will not be used in the context of a criminal case: only a specific element that enables 
biometric identification will be extracted and analysed. Nevertheless, for the ECtHR it is significant 
that, although only a small part of the data will be used, all other sensitive information is obtained and 
retained as well when a cellular sample is taken: 
                                                             
21 ECtHR (GC) S. & Marper v. UK, appl.nos. 30562/04, 30566/04, § 86, 120 (4 December 2008). 
22 Idem. at § 72, 120. 
23 Idem. at § 74-76. 
24 Idem. at § 71.  
25 Idem. at § 78, 81, 84, 86. 
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“In addition to the highly personal nature of cellular samples, the Court notes that they contain 
much sensitive information about an individual, including information about his or her health. 
Moreover, samples contain a unique genetic code of great relevance to both the individual and 
his relatives. (…) Given the nature and the amount of personal information contained in cellular 
samples, their retention per se must be regarded as interfering with the right to respect for the 
private lives of the individuals concerned. That only a limited part of this information is actually 
extracted or used by the authorities through DNA profiling and that no immediate detriment is 
caused in a particular case does not change this conclusion.” 26  
 
The extent to which present forms of brain-reading involve such a ‘trawl-like’ collection of data will 
depend on the particular test and its technology. For example, the information yielded through a 
concealed information test, applied with EEG, can be quite restricted by the specific purpose of the test, 
e.g.: do you recognise this particular knife? Electrodes on the subject’s scull measure particular brain 
electricity and the analysis focusses on a specific brain wave (P300), indicating whether or not one 
recognised the presented stimuli [42]. If the same test is applied with fMRI, however, the acquired 
information will probably be less restricted, since the fMRI-scanner does not measure specific brain 
activity, but makes a functional image of the whole brain in action. Depending on the analytical methods 
that are used to interpret the data, a prima facie limited fMRI-memory-detection-test might actually 
provide a great deal of other information, e.g., regarding medical predispositions, risk of future 
offending, or even sexual proclivities. In addition, if new technologies and decoding systems will enable 
unfiltered, trawl-like detection of particular thoughts or emotions, the acquired data will no longer be 
restricted by the purpose of the test, but by those things the defendant feels or thinks about [37,43].  
In conclusion, it is important to note that despite the highly sensitive nature of cellular samples, 
the ECtHR has repeatedly ruled that the compulsorily taking, examination and retention of cellular 
material and DNA-profiles for identification purposes, was – with a certain discretion for the State – 
necessary and proportionate for the detection and prevention of crime and the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.27 In doing so, the Court tailored the generic right to respect for private life to 
the intricacies of forensic DNA-testing. Similarly, we argue, a legal approach tailored to forensic brain-
reading can be developed under Article 8 ECHR as well. Although DNA-testing and brain-reading are 
in several respects disanalogous, case-law on DNA may provide helpful insights for how to develop 
such an approach, but cannot be applied to forensic brain-reading directly. Nonetheless, it provides a 
rough direction. At least, we can safely conclude that non-consensual (forensic) brain-reading is 
covered by the general fundamental right to privacy. How the law should treat specific infringements 
within the context of Article 8 ECHR, is, however, an open question.  
 
3.4 The right not to incriminate oneself (Article 6 ECHR) 
Finally, let us turn to the right against self-incrimination—a right that normally only applies to 
defendants, and not, for example, to witnesses. According to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, the 
right to remain silent and not to incriminate oneself are generally recognised international standards 
                                                             
26 Cf. ECtHR (GC) S. & Marper v. UK, appl.nos. 30562/04, 30566/04, § 72-73 (4 December 2008). 
27 E.g. ECtHR Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany, appl.nos. 7841/08, 57900/12, § 44-49 (4 June 2013); ECtHR 
W. v. The Netherlands, appl.no. 20689/08, 9 (20 January 2009); ECtHR Schmidt v. Germany, appl.no. 2352/02 
(5 January 2006). 
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which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair trial contained in Article 6 ECHR.28 Their rationale lies, 
inter alia, in the protection of defendants against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby 
contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of the right to 
a fair trial as laid down in Article 6 ECHR.29  
According to the Grand Chamber, “the right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned 
with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent and presupposes that the prosecution in a 
criminal case seek to prove their case without resorting to evidence obtained through methods of 
coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused.”30 Accordingly, respecting the will of a 
defendant not to produce any self-incriminating evidence is the primary aim of this right [44, p. 266]. It 
does not protect against the eliciting of an incriminating statement per se, but against the obtaining of 
evidence by means of coercion or oppression.31 Ultimately, evidence which has been obtained without 
respecting the will of the accused not to produce the evidence, may not be used against him in his 
criminal procedure [45,46]. 
 In the Saunders landmark case, the Court formulated an important limitation of the scope of the 
right against self-incrimination: 
 
“it does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from 
the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of 
the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, 
blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing.”32 
 
Case-law on the precise scope of this exception is, however, not clear. Whereas the Court approaches 
‘documents acquired pursuant to a warrant’ as material which has an existence independent of the will 
of the suspect, therefore falling beyond the scope of the right not to incriminate oneself, the obligation 
to provide certain unspecified documents, which could only be obtained with the cooperation of the 
person concerned, did violate this right.33 Therefore, what the Court precisely means with material 
which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect, is debatable. One interpretation is that 
information which can be acquired without the cooperation of the suspect, so which can be obtained 
independently of the defendant’s will, exceeds the scope of the right [44,45]. In this view, the question 
is whether the defendant’s cooperation is necessary in order to obtain the information. If so, the 
information and the coercive acquisition of it fall within the scope of the right against self-incrimination. 
Such a ‘means-based’ approach, in which the manner of obtaining evidence is decisive rather 
than the nature of the acquired information, makes sense in light of the primary aim of the right: 
respecting the will of an accused person not to provide self-incriminating evidence [45]. If the evidence 
can only be acquired with cooperation of the suspect who refuses to cooperate, the evidence can only 
be obtained through breaking the suspect’s will not to provide the information (e.g., by making severe 
                                                             
28 ECtHR (GC) Ibrahim and others/UK, appl.nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08, 40351/09, § 266 (13 
September 2016). 
29 Idem. 
30 Idem. 
31 ECtHR (GC) Ibrahim and others/UK, appl.nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08, 40351/09, § 267 (13 
September 2016). 
32 ECtHR GC) Saunders v. UK, appl.no. 19187/91, § 69 (17 December 1996). See more recently: ECtHR 
Caruana v. Malta, appl.no. 41079/16, § 36 (15 May 2018). 
33 ECtHR Funke v. France, appl.no. 10828/84 (25 February 1993); ECtHR J.B. v. Switzerland, appl.no. 
31827/96 (3 May 2001).  
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threats). Such a way of obtaining evidence is, however, not allowed under the right not to incriminate 
oneself.  
 On this view, whether the right against self-incrimination protects from non-consensual 
forensic brain-reading depends on whether the brain-reading application requires the subject’s 
cooperation. In general, functional neuroimaging during which the subject must perform a certain task 
does indeed require cooperation. In the context of memory and lie detection, for instance, the subject 
must attentively observe certain stimuli or press a yes-or-no-button after each question.34 Furthermore, 
the subject must refrain from manipulating the test using countermeasures. Hence, the results of such 
functional neuroimaging applications could not be obtained from any other source than the cooperating 
subject himself, and are thus, in general, protected from non-consensual acquisition. 
By contrast, in principle, structural imaging technologies do not require cooperation of the 
subject. At least in theory, the intended results can be obtained while the subject is under general 
anaesthesia. Therefore, non-consensual structural neuroimaging, for example in the context of 
diagnostics or neuroprediction, does not, according to this view, fall within the scope of the right against 
self-incrimination.35 As a consequence, the right not to incriminate oneself seems mainly to protect 
against non-consensual functional neuroimaging that requires cooperation, such as the detection of lies 
and memories.  
Notably, however, the right against self-incrimination only applies to an individual who is 
‘charged with a criminal offence’.36 Accordingly, normally it does not apply to witnesses in a criminal 
case.37 Secondly, the rights and principles of Article 6 ECHR do not apply to procedures regarding 
preventive measures without any concrete suspicion,38 such as the use of neuroprediction or brain-based 
diagnostics in the context of involuntary admission in health care. Non-consensual neuroimaging in 
these contexts will thus not be covered by the right not to incriminate oneself. Finally, since procedures 
regarding the execution of criminal sanctions do not involve the determination of a criminal charge, 
Article 6 ECHR does not apply in such cases.39 As a consequence, the right against self-incrimination 
will not cover non-consensual neuroimaging in the context of the execution of criminal sanctions, such 
as brain-based risk assessment of prisoners who request parole, or the use of lie detection to verify 
whether a convicted offender complies with his conditions of probation.  
 
3.5 Synthesis  
In this section we explored the extent to which the ECHR protects against the non-consensual 
acquisition of (personal) information through forensic brain-reading. The right to freedom of thought 
(Article 9 ECHR) will only offer protection if neuroimaging reveals ‘thoughts’ or ‘beliefs’. Whereas 
brain-reading for the purposes of forensic diagnostics and risk assessment typically does not reveal 
thoughts, futuristic real-time thought reading could fall within the scope of Article 9 ECHR. Whether 
present forms of memory and lie detection yield any thoughts, and are thus protected by Article 9 
ECHR, is, as yet, less clear. It is clear though, that reading a person’s brain (activity) with neuroimaging 
is covered by the generic right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR). While case-law on DNA-testing might 
suggest that some forms of non-consensual brain-reading could be lawful in this context, the (case-)law 
                                                             
34 Cf. [47,48]. 
35 This could only be different under certain exceptional circumstances, i.e. if excessive forms of physical or 
psychological pressure are used, often in the form of treatment which constitutes torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment in the means of article 3 ECHR [10,49]. 
36 ECtHR Funke v. France, appl.no. 10828/84, § 44 (25 February 1993). See also [44, p. 250-251]. 
37 Cf. ECtHR Wanner v. Germany, appl.no. 26892/12 (23 October 2018). 
38 ECtHR (GC) Tommaso v. Italy, appl.no. 43395/09, § 143 (23 February 2017). 
39 ECtHR (GC) Boulois v. Luxembourg, appl.no. 37575/04, § 85 (3 April 2012); ECtHR Ganci v. Italy, appl.no. 
41576/98, § 20-22 (30 October 2003).  
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should develop its own approach for this type of data-acquisition, within the doctrine of Article 8 
ECHR. Finally, we explored the implications of the right against self-incrimination (Article 6 ECHR), 
and concluded that this right, in general, mainly protects against deploying brain-reading (in the 
determination of a criminal charge) if the test at issue requires cooperation of the subject. The right will 
normally not cover structural brain-reading applications (such as MRI and CT for the purposes of 
diagnostics or risk assessment) and nor will it cover the use of functional brain-reading tests like lie and 
memory detection, when deployed in the execution of criminal sanctions. 
 
4. Discussion: The desirability of a novel fundamental right to mental privacy 
 
As discussed above, the current framework of European human rights does not universally prohibit the 
use of non-consensual brain-reading in criminal justice: particular brain-reading applications could be 
lawful. Let us now look briefly at the most prominent arguments for explicitly recognising a 
fundamental right to mental privacy that would provide fuller protection against non-consensual 
forensic brain-reading.  
 
4.1. The special features of brain data 
In a recent paper, Marcello Ienca and Roberto Andorno discuss the implications of emerging 
neurotechnologies in the context of European human rights, and suggest that existing human rights may 
not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. As to the collection of brain data and the right to 
mental privacy, they argue that 
 
“the special nature of brain data, which relates very directly to one’s inner life and personhood, 
and the distinct way in which such data are obtained, suggest that specific safeguards will be 
probably needed in this domain” [12, p. 14].  
 
They further argue that  
 
“current privacy and data protection rights are insufficient to cope with the emerging 
neurotechnological scenarios. Consequently, we suggest the formal recognition of a right to 
mental privacy” [p. 15]. 
 
One of the special features of brain data, they maintain, is that the information to be protected is not 
easily distinguishable from the source that produced it, i.e. the subject’s neural processing. Because of 
this “inception problem”, wider privacy and data protection rights are needed, which not only protect 
the recorded and retained information, but also the source of that information since they may be 
inseparable. In order to implement this, the authors argue, “we would need wider privacy and data 
protection rights that can be also applied at a higher and chronologically antecedent level: our neural 
activity.” 
 In response, we note that the existence of an “inception problem” can be questioned. We might 
distinguish between information about neural/mental states, and the neural/mental states themselves 
(the source of that information).40 It is not clear that the relationship between source and information 
here is any different to the relationship that exists with respect to other forms of data.  
Moreover, the authors do not explain why such an inseparable relation between source and 
information would justify extraordinary privacy protection, or why the existing right to privacy is 
                                                             
40 In philosophy of mind, even those who hold that mental states are fully determined by brain states typically 
allow that the two are in some way distinct.  
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inadequate in this respect. Even if they have correctly identified a descriptive feature of information 
acquired through brain-reading – that it cannot easily be distinguished from its source – there is a further 
question as to whether this descriptive feature ought to be given legal significance. Arguing that it ought, 
is unlikely to be straightforward given that genetic information presumably also raises the “inception 
problem”, which information is as yet approached under the generic right to privacy pursuant to Article 
8 ECHR. 
To avoid these concerns, Ienca and Andorno could shift the focus away from the inception 
problem, and towards their claim that brain data “relates very directly to one’s inner life and 
personhood”. However, while this descriptive claim seems plausible, the supposed normative 
implications seem again less self-evident than the authors suggest. It is not clear why the results of 
brain-reading per se relate more to one’s inner life and personhood than current (non-consensual) 
methods of gathering information in the context of criminal justice, such as DNA-testing, psychiatric 
diagnostics and risk assessment, which regularly concern highly sensitive and even intimate issues, 
from ethnic origins over biographical and psychological development of persons to disorders or sexual 
dysfunction. For example, should we consider ‘the recognition of a particular gun’, identified through 
EEG-based memory detection, to be more personal than one’s ethnic origin disclosed through DNA-
testing, just because the former concerns ‘brain data’?  
Note, finally, that if (the interpretation of) brain-reading results will enable the future 
acquisition of information about particular (sensitive) thoughts, the use of non-consensual brain-reading 
may trigger stronger legal protection by the existing right to freedom of thought (Article 9 ECHR). Up 
to that point, the current right to privacy seems able to cover all privacy-interests of those who are 
subjected to forensic brain-reading.  
 
4.2. Autonomy 
Another argument that advocates special privacy protection for brain-reading, is the argument from 
autonomy. In discussing the implications of detecting mental states through neural prosthetics, Andrea 
Lavazza underlines the (ethical) premise that the absolute privacy of one’s mental states and content, is 
one of the most valuable and inviolable human rights. This is due to its close link to autonomy:  
 
“privacy, understood as the secrecy of one’s brain data and mental contents, is key to a free 
conduct, because autonomy is exercised not only in public but also in private. Being spied on 
through mind-reading reduces the subject’s autonomy in the Kantian sense, that is, the subject 
can be limited in self-imposing her own norm of conduct, free of external pressures and 
conditioning (which are only avoided by keeping one’s thoughts private)” [13, p. 4].  
 
From the perspective of criminal law, however, this argument could be debated. First, the mere 
neurotechnological acquisition of particular personal data within the context of a criminal procedure, 
such as whether one suffers from traumatic brain injury or recognises a particular gun, would probably 
not restrict the subject in ‘the right to make choices as to how to lead one’s own life’, which is how the 
ECtHR defines the right to personal autonomy.41 Moreover, restricting autonomy is not uncommon in 
criminal law, e.g., by imposing the duty on a witness to testify truthfully. Investigating whether this 
duty is observed by a witness is then hardly a further relevant setback to autonomy. So, while autonomy 
is certainly a background consideration, and an important principle underlying the interpretation of 
Article 8 ECHR,42 it appears too broad to generate more concrete demands on privacy protection in this 
                                                             
41 ECtHR M. and M. v. Croatia, appl.no. 10161/13, § 171 (September 3, 2015), which had been at stake in cases 
regarding abortion, euthanasia and recognition of transsexuals. 
42 ECtHR (GC) Bărbulescu v. Romania, appl.no. 61496/08, § 70. 
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particular and exceptional scenario. Secondly, since current ‘mind reading’ neuroimaging requires 
cooperation on the part of the subject, the subject in fact always keeps (some) control over whether or 
not the authorities acquire the intended information [50]. But even if we assume that coercive brain-
reading could completely circumvent a person’s will not to reveal particular, undisclosed information 
the question arises why non-consensual disclosure of such previously undisclosed information through 
neuroimaging justifies stronger legal protection than the disclosure of information through other means, 
such as tapping telephones and reading diaries. Again: privacy is an important good, but why is mental 
privacy qualitatively different?  
In our view, existing (European human rights) law already rules out the obviously 
impermissible use of brain-reading technologies, and provides the resources for deciding on ‘grey area’ 
technologies. Hence, although the explicit recognition of a novel right to mental privacy may underline 
the importance of this particular human interest, it is at best superfluous to provide adequate legal 
protection. What is needed for this purpose, however, is a legal construal of the existent rights tailored 
to the use of non-consensual brain-reading that fits within the present doctrines, such as Article 8(2) 
ECHR. Such tailoring is, however, a commonplace legal activity. It is necessary to determine the 
strength of privacy protection with respect to various brain-reading techniques, on a more fine-grained 
level. Legal systems can develop this with respect to particular purposes and methods, and this process 
of shaping the right to privacy is to some extent open to political debate and ethical oversight. But it 
will, ultimately, be a balancing between legitimate interests on either side.43 A novel right to mental 
privacy would not change this, it would encounter the same conflicting interests.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Neuroimaging technologies enable the reading out of different types of information from our brains, 
offering a new, potentially valuable tool for non-consensual data-acquisition in the context of criminal 
procedure (in the future). Although some forms of non-consensual forensic brain-reading could be 
lawful under the current framework of European human rights, existing fundamental rights do rule out 
the obviously impermissible uses of brain-reading, and provide the resources for deciding on others. In 
this paper, we focussed on Articles 6, 8 and 9 ECHR. In addition, as briefly mentioned, the prohibition 
on ill-treatment pursuant to Article 3 ECHR shall also set some fundamental boundaries to the use of 
forensic brain-reading. Altogether, in order to effectively guarantee the right to mental privacy, a novel 
fundamental right is, in our view, not necessary. Instead, we argue, developing a legal approach that 
tailors the existing doctrine of fundamental (privacy) rights to the use of non-consensual brain-reading, 
would be desirable and deserves closer examination.  
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